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Dune

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

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Dune

Arrakis - Dune - Desert planet

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Slender, 14 > The other held a slender, short man with an effminate face.

Poignant, 15 > Emperor believes he’s given the Duke your spice planet. How poignant.

Waggish, 16 > How waggish of you

Pliant, 17 > But surely Leto will know whose hand directed the pliant doctor

Salient, 19 > Now, Piter, outline for my nephew the salient features of our campaign agaisnt the House of Atreides.

Renegade, 20 > There are certain preparations that indicate when a House is going renegade.

Mongrel, 22 > except for the few mongrel Fremen hiding in the skirts of the desert

Scurrying >

Crone >

Twanged > the old woman asked. Her voice wheezed and twanged like an untuned baliset.

Volition > He fought down an aching shiver, stares at the lightless void where his hand seemed to remain of its own volition.

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Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Pedantic, xii > It was primarily a Latin school, strict and pedantic, where Kant studied the classics,

Rote, xii > largely by rote; the enforced outward piety experienced in

Impetus, xii > in this school was an impetus to his lifelong endeavor to seperate the social practices of religion from its intellectual and moral substance.

Internment, xv > brought it to the cathedral for the internment in the “professors’ vault.

Predicate, xvi > He defined ontology as the science of the “predicates of being,” i.e., of general predicates for describing what does or might have being, or exist.

Hitherto, xviii > and hitherto unrecognized, cognitive status, which he describes as “synthetic a priori.”

Redress, xx > The new work was motivated both by a desire to redress the dissappointing reception of the Critique bu publishing a more approachable work,

Laudatory, xxii > Beyond its laudatory introduction, the review is largely put together by copying Kant’s own phrasing.

Connotation, xxiii > In this context the word “intuition” does not have the connotation of “following a feeling,”

Syllogistic, xxiv > “logic” meant not only general logic, which in his time was syllogistic logic, but also what he called “transcendental logic,” in which the cognitive conditions on “thinking” objects are determined.

Antecedent, xxv > Other cases requiring special attention include “condition” and “conditioned”; something is “conditioned” by antecedent states of affairs that set the “conditions” for its occurence, as the heat of the fire as a “condition” that determines the temperature of the soup, the heated soup then being a state of affairs that is “conditioned.”

Abridging, xxvii > Because the Critique is long and difficult, Kant is abridging its contents in these Prolegomena, following the “analytic” as opposed to the “synthetic” method.

Congruence, xxviii > In geometry, proofs of the equality of two figures depend on judgments of congruence, based upon wimmediate intuition”, if such intuition were empirical, it could not sup port the apodictically certain propositions of geometry; Kant mentions other geometrical proofs to show that they cannot be based on concepts but require intuition.

Spatial, xxviii > The consideration of incongruent counterparts shows that spatial objects cannot be adequately cognized by concepts alone, but require intuitions; this observation will free the reader of the conception that space and time are qualities of things in themselves.

Conformity, xxix > Kant then asks: “How is it possible in general to cognize a priori the necessary conformity to law of experience itself with regard to all of its objects?”

Disjunctive, xxxi > The transcendental ideas are obtained by reflecting on the three forms of the syllogism (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive).

Purported, xxxiv > and in the question of the relation of our modes of representation to the reality they are purported to represent.

Emended, xl > The emended text is not without minor problems (for the correction of which a paragraph break has been added), but it is much improved over editions that do not accept the reorganization.

Pronomial, xli > I have tried to avoid introducing ambiguities into the English that would result from the fact that German pronouns carry gender in relation to all nouns, and are more fully declined than English pronouns; hence, on many occasions I have replaced pronomial expressions with their antecedents.

Incessantly, 5 > If it is not, how does it happen that, under the pretense of a science it incessantly shows off, and strings along the human understanding with hopes that never dim but are never fulfilled?

Adherent, 6 > Further, it has lost a great many of its adherents, and one does not find that those who feel strong enough to shine in other sciences wish to risk their reputations in this one, where anyone, usually ignorant in all other things, lays claim to a decisive opinion, since in this region there are in fact still no reliable weights and measures with which to distinguish profundity from shallow babble.

Acute, 8 > The acute man was, however, looking only to the negative benefit that curbing the excessive claims of speculative reason would have, in completely abolishing so many endless and continual conflicts that perplex the human species; he mean while lost sight of the positive harm that results if reason is deprived of the most important vistas, from which alone it can stake out for the will the highest goal of all the will’s endeavors.

Perplex, 8 >

Vistas, 8 >

Expedient, 9 > They therefore found a more expedient means to be obstinate without any insight, namely, the appeal to ordinary common sense.

Obstinate, 9 >

Sagacious, 10 > If we begin from a wellgrounded though undeveloped thought that another bequeaths us, then we can well hope, by continued reflection, to take it further than could, the sagacious man whom one has to thank for the first spark of this light.

Exactitude, 11 > Now I admit that I do not expect to hear complaints from a philosopher regarding lack of popularity, entertainment, and ease, when the matter concerns the existence of highly prized knowledge that is indispensable to humanity, knowledge that cannot be constituted except according to the strictest rules of scholarly exactitude, and to which even popularity may indeed come with time but can never be there at the start.

Putative, 12 > To approach a new science- one that is entirely isolated and is the only one of its kind - with the prejudice that it can be judged by means of one’s putative cognitions already other wise obtained, even though it is precisely the reality of those that must first be completely called into question, results only in believing that one sees every where something that was already otherwise known, because the expressions perhaps sound similar; except that everything must seem to be extremely deformed, contradictory, and nonsensical, because one does not thereby make the author’s thoughts fundamental, but always simply one’s own, made natural through long habit.

Copiousness, 12 > Yet the copiousness of the work, insofar as it is rooted in the science itself and not in the presentation, and the inevitable dryness and scholastic exactitude that result, are qualities that indeed may be extremely advantageous to the subject matter itself, but must of course be detrimental to the book itself.

Encroached, 13 > But pure reason is such an isolated domain, within itself so thoroughly connected, that no part of it can be encroached upon without disturbing all the rest, nor adjusted without having previously determined for each part its place and its influence on the others; for, since there is nothing outside of it that could correct our judgment within it, the validity and use of each part depends on the relation in which it stands to the others within reason itself, and, as with the structure of an organized body, the purpose of any member can be derived onlv from the complete concept of the whole.

Indolence, Dimwittedness, 13 > a familiar cloaking for one’s own indolence or dimwittedness